So...Latour is Confusing.

Bruno Latour’s chapter Third source of uncertainty: Objects too have agency presents a conceptualization of objects which is at once intriguing and yet difficult to reconcile within my own way of seeing things (pun intended). So, what is it Latour’s contention, and what are my difficulties with these? Let us begin with ascertaining what, exactly (from what I gather) the argument(s) are. The chapter reads as a critique of social inquiry’s fusion between explanandum and explanans, particularly of sociology (2007, 63). Regarding this, Latour discusses power; there are multiple hierarchies - “asymmetries.” However, often power, like societal norms, societal structure and so forth as given as the reason, the the explanandum (2007, 64). Latour wants us (i.e. sociologists and, I would venture, social scientists generally) to critically examine these asymmetries of power in society in and of themselves, and not as (merely) explanatory elements. While I applaud this albeit mundane normative project, I’d quite like Latour to elaborate on these asymmetries. He fails to do so satisfactorily, so let us move on while keeping this in mind.

Latour follows this with an extension to the ‘social.’ He problematizes this as consisting of ‘social ties’ and ‘associations’ - that latter being of interest for ANT (actor-network theory) where ‘social’ pertains to “momentary association which is characterized by the way it gathers together in new shapes” (Ibid.: 2007, 65). So, the ‘social’ for this examination of asymmetries of power (and/or of society?), examined through social inquiry, is a fleeting moment where things come together. Where do objects come into this picture? This is the second part of Latour’s objective - the reaffirmation of social inquiry as an equally valid field as that of ‘material’ studies, e.g. physics, biology and so forth (2007, 83). Indeed, he argues that the very division between the ‘social’ and the ‘material’ is constructed (2007, 75-6)! Objects, for ANT, are an equally valid and crucial element to examine as social (meant in the vernacular sense) elements: They are both actors in power asymmetries and society, as well part of the forces of (a?) “collectivity,” which refers to the newly-recognizable ‘reality’ of the combined effects of material/objects and human actors (2007, 72: 75).

A serious problem in Latour’s piece is the lack of sufficient -any- evidence and explication supporting his claims. While the chapter is highly theoretical, some evidence is greatly needed. (For an example of this, see Latour’s argument of sociological tautology, p. 67, as well as the ‘example’ of Strum’s baboons, p. 69.)

I’d like to note that when reading this, Latour’s points seemed clear, if lacking sufficient evidence. While not necessarily jumping fully on board, I found his arguments interesting and certainly worth consideration. Upon writing this commentary, however, I find myself more confused. This may be due to the holes in the chapter which would, hopefully, be elaborated in other sections of the work. It may be due to the radically alternative paradigm Latour proposes regarding organization of examining ‘the social.’ It certainly highlights the importance and value of having to critically reflect and write these weekly commentaries, which illustrate where our intellectual capacity falters, and our own paradigms are strained. This is, I believe, where my problem with Latour’s work is situated. While I am fully able to reconcile the notions of object agency into my outlook on social sciences, how we engage questions regarding the social world and so forth, the radical shift proposed vis-a-vis human action and object/material causality - although these do not act in symmetry - in Latour’s theory is hard to wrap my head around (2007, 85: 76). Perhaps this is because the re-evaluation proposed here upsets our (my) understanding of ourselves (myself) - and this is hardly ever comfortable, though often necessary.

In light of this, I’d like to pose two somewhat straight-forward questions, which I believe are nonetheless crucial to consider when reflecting upon this piece:

(1) Why is Latour interesting to reflect upon within the progression of our course so far? That is, why do you think we are reading this? (Beyond the obvious answer pertaining to the radical and transformative reassessment he proposes.)

Does it matter if Latour is “right” or “wrong”? Should we just satisfy ourselves with viewing his re-conceptualizations of, well, pretty much everything, as one component in the continued dialectic of intellectual and scholarly progress? Or, is this merely placing Latour within our current paradigms of material and social distinctions, and thus doing him an injustice?

(And it clearly seems that I have more than merely “two straight-forward questions”.)