Wednesday, February 2, 2011

"The idea that we can't blame everything on capitalism kinda freaks me out"

Thomas’ chapter was a really interesting read, considering it touched upon those two points that I found the most thought provoking from the previous weeks readings; that of the private/public (structural/idiosyncratic) distinction, and the nature of the gift and its similarity to/distinction from the commodity.
Thomas goes into more depth of the nature of gift giving, as outlined by C. A. Gregory, who notes that commodity relations are between things and gift relations are between people. Gift giving, according to him, establishes a relationship of indebtedness between the giver and receiver. Gift giving has a distinctly social and political effect.
Thomas disagrees with Appadurai’s insistence on suppressing the distinction between commodity and gifts, mentioning its inalienability as one of those distinctions which must be recognized in order to have a better understanding of the nature of those particular exchanges. I think Thomas may be onto something there, but wonder how to fit this in with his (and my) other understanding that in capitalist societies almost anything can be given monetary value.
I don’t think that these two claims are necessarily contradictory, but wonder how they can function together, especially in capitalist societies. Is it maybe that the simple experience of receiving an object can multiply its monetary value? Here I’m thinking of a few things; one is either Kracauer or Benjamin (always get them mixed up...) on art, and how an objects ‘aura,’ the knowledge that it has certain lived experiences (being in contact with a famous painter, being really old, etc) can make it infinitely more valuable than an exact copy of the piece, but still with some measurable monetary value. I’m also thinking of an article I read (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/02/090207150518.htm) on the idea that money can buy experiences, which bring happiness, more than objects themselves. Do gifts then embody a certain kind of experience? Can this be bought and sold? Is it possible to understand gift-giving as an experience on which we can place monetary value, thereby putting it into a subcategory that still resides under the banner commodity? Or am I just delusional in my inability to see capitalism as escapable? I guess I’m struggling to buy Thomas’s assertion that some objects hold a value “that are incompatible with exchange,” at least in a capitalist society. What about in ‘moments of crisis?’

I’m not sure how I feel about Miller’s piece – whether I disagree with it or am afraid to agree with it. I super liked his ridicule of those who attempt to explain social phenomena using human evolution, as well as of those who neglect to take symbolic or cultural meaning of objects into account and focus on functionality. The question of the invisible framing of situations by objects was also largely convincing.
I wish I had a more sophisticated understanding of Marx and Simmel so that I could understand and critique his readings of them more effectively. I found (what I remember of) Simmel’s essay on the Metropolis awkward in its ahistoricism and generalizations of human nature, so the derivative assertion that culture is intrinsically contradictory already begins to sit uneasily with me. Disregarding Simmel though, the idea that this contradiction is inescapable and not just a symptom of capitalism was really interesting, though I am still struggling to grapple with it, especially with how then culture can be conceptualized and differentiated in (non) capitalist societies, if it exists in both.. It reminded me of Bonnie Honig when she said that politics is contradictory, because politics is simply struggle/power negotiation, but those who are engaged in politics are actually trying to move beyond it – into apolitical utopia. If we understand commodity exchange and culture as politics and power, I suppose this contradiction makes sense, though...
The troubling of the distinction and relationship between materiality and immateriality was interesting – especially in the way that Miller demonstrated that this paradox is not unique to religious domains. Though, I’m not sure whether the very fact that one can be used to signify the other necessarily means that they cannot be categorized separately. It seems as though there is something about each of these states that necessitates the distinction and the symbolism in the first place. I can appreciate the blurriness of the line but am not sure whether it can be eradicated completely.

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